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In Scots law, the trust and the floating charge are two institutions that have been notably influenced by 
English law.1 They are also comparable in a number of other respects. All types of property, capable of 
being owned, can be secured by a floating charge or held in trust. A trust constitutes a “fund” in which 
one asset is replaced by another through real subrogation and this also applies to the fluctuating property 
encompassed by a floating charge.2 In addition, like a floating charge, a trust can be used as a security 
                                                          
* PhD candidate and Teaching Fellow in Commercial Law, University of Edinburgh. I would like to thank 
Professor George Gretton, Andrew Sweeney, Scott Wortley and the anonymous peer reviewers for their helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this article. I am also grateful for the support provided by the Edinburgh Legal 
Education Trust. 
1 There is, however, uncertainty regarding the extent to which the origins of trusts law in Scotland are 
independent from English law: G Gretton, “Trusts” in K Reid and R Zimmermann (eds), The History of Private 
Law in Scotland: Volume 1 – Introduction and Property (2000) 484ff. See also D J Carr, Ideas of Equity (2017) 
paras 4-05ff. In this article, “English law” is generally used in a wide sense to include equity. 
2 Regarding real subrogation in trusts, see G L Gretton and A J M Steven, Property, Trusts and Succession, 3rd 
edn (2017) para 23.6; Gretton (n 1) 484. See R C Nolan, “Property in a fund” (2004) 120 LQR 108 for the view 
that floating charges and trusts in English law both consist of interests in property in a fund. In Scots law a 
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device.3 Yet there are also significant differences between them. The ways in which they arrived and 
developed in Scots law are markedly divergent.4 And there are also contrasts regarding their integration 
within the legal system, and with respect to the legal relationships of the parties involved with each.5  
Understanding the respective natures of trusts and floating charges, and how they operate, 
obviously assists with determining the content of their interaction. That is certainly true in the present 
article, which contains an extensive doctrinal analysis of floating charges and trust property in Scots 
law. It uses the dual patrimony approach of trust law to interpret the floating charge’s creation, 
attachment and enforcement, and thereby demonstrates that it is not possible under the current law to 
effectively charge property held by a company in trust. Although this conclusion aligns with the 
orthodox view regarding floating charges over trust property in Scots law, following Tay Valley Joinery 
Ltd v CF Financial Services Ltd,6 that view is often expressed with minimal discussion and 
explanation.7 By contrast, this article identifies the application of the dual patrimony theory as a broader 
foundation explaining the current legal position. 
The article also serves an additional purpose. It diagnoses issues that would need to be resolved 
if the law were to be successfully reformed to enable the charging of trust property. Indeed, the Scottish 
Law Commission has previously identified certain problems involving floating charges and trust 
property that would require attention in a reform context, and these are discussed in more detail in this 
paper. The Scottish Law Commission proposed that such problems would be considered further in the 
context of their review of the law of trusts.8 However, that project has now concluded without any 
recommendations regarding the charging of property held in trust.  
It is unclear how popular allowing a company to create a floating charge over its trust property 
would actually be, but it would certainly command some support.9 And there is undoubtedly a policy 
argument that can be made in favour of doing so.10 Despite floating charges having received much 
                                                          
floating charge encompasses changing property but its holder has no real right in the property, at least until 
attachment. 
3 Clark Taylor & Co Ltd v Quality Site Development (Edinburgh) Ltd 1981 SC 111 (albeit that the attempt to 
create a trust in this case failed); Tay Valley Joinery Ltd v CF Financial Services Ltd 1987 SLT 207. And see 
e.g. Report on Trust Law (Scot Law Com No 239, 2014) paras 2.13ff; W A Wilson and A G M Duncan, Trusts, 
Trustees and Executors, 2nd edn (1995) ch 4. 
4 The origins of trusts in Scots private law are obscure but date back to the seventeenth century (and beyond): 
Gretton (n 1). By contrast, floating charges were rejected at common law in Scotland (see Carse v Coppen 1951 
SC 233) and were introduced only via the Companies (Floating Charges) (Scotland) Act 1961. 
5 For details of how the trust is conceptualised in Scots law, see the next section.  
6 1987 SLT 207. This case is discussed at various points below. 
7 See e.g. W M Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland, 14th edn, by H L MacQueen et al (2017) para 
36.03, n 26; G Morse (ed), Palmer’s Company Law, 25th edn (Looseleaf) (1992-) para 13.402; I M Fletcher and 
R Roxburgh, Greene and Fletcher, The Law and Practice of Receivership in Scotland, 3rd edn (2005) para 2.42. 
8 Report on Registration of Rights in Security by Companies (Scot Law Com No 197, 2004) para 2.32. 
9 It is noted ibid, para 2.30, that a majority of consultees supported the proposal to allow companies to charge 
trust property, but some “expressed reservations” and identified difficulties. 
10 It would be possible to write a separate paper on the policy issues involved. 
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criticism from certain quarters,11 they remain widely used and are popular among many practitioners 
and their clients. A trustee company, without being able to create a floating charge, is highly restricted 
in terms of the security it can grant over trust property in Scots law (including in comparison to English 
law).12 A common view is that the more security a party can grant over its assets, the greater the 
likelihood that another party will be willing to lend, and at more favourable rates than would otherwise 
be the case.13 As such, the power to create a floating charge over trust property could allow a trustee to 
access additional funding, which might help fulfil the trust purposes. (The Scottish Law Commission’s 
proposal to introduce a new non-possessory form of real security over moveables would also assist in 
this regard.)14 In the present writer’s view, allowing a professional trustee company to charge its trust 
property when borrowing for trust purposes would be a broadly acceptable outcome; however, the 
present article shows that this is not realisable under the current law and highlights doctrinal 
impediments to the charging of trust property. It also suggests that a prime objective of any reform 
ought to be coherence with the wider law, and especially with the dual patrimony approach.15 
 
B. TRUST PROPERTY 
 
In a trust, there are three parties: (1) the truster(s);16 (2) the trustee(s); and (3) the beneficiary (or 
beneficiaries). The truster creates the trust and transfers property into it. The trustee holds that property 
for the benefit of another, the beneficiary, who has a “beneficial interest” in the property. In Scots law 
a range of views have been advanced over time as to which of the truster,17 trustee18 and beneficiary19 
owns the trust property. The established modern view is a formalistic one: the trustee is owner.20 
Doctrinally, Scots law relies upon personal and real rights to explain the trust, whereas English law uses 
the divided ownership arising from law and equity; the trustee has legal ownership of trust property 
                                                          
11 See e.g. G L Gretton, “Reception without Integration? Floating Charges and Mixed Systems” (2003) 78 
Tulane LR 307; and D Cabrelli, “The Case Against the Floating Charge in Scotland” (2005) 9 EdinLR 407. 
12 These general restrictions on creating security rights over moveable property led to the introduction of the 
floating charge in 1961: see Law Reform Committee for Scotland, Eighth Report of the Law Reform Committee 
for Scotland: The Constitution of Security over Moveable Property; and Floating Charges (Cmnd 1017) (1960). 
13 However, for criticism of this view in relation to floating charges in Scots law, see Cabrelli (n 11) at 418ff. 
14 See the Discussion Paper on Moveable Transactions (Scot Law Com DP No 151, 2011). The follow-up report 
is expected to have been published by the time this article goes to print. 
15 The dual patrimony approach is discussed in Section B. 
16 Also known by the English term “settlor(s)”. 
17 At least for certain types of trust, see G L Gretton, “Radical rights and radical wrongs” (1986) Jur Rev 51 and 
192.  
18 This is the traditional view espoused by the Institutional Writers: e.g. Stair, Inst, I, 13, 7; Bell, Commentaries, 
5th edn (1826) I, 35f. See also the discussion by T B Smith, A Short Commentary on the Law of Scotland (1962) 
570ff.  
19 See e.g. Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Millar (1892) 19 R (HL) 43 at 46f per Lord Watson, who, in the 
context of the case, described the beneficiary as “the true owner”.  
20 See e.g. Inland Revenue v Clark’s Trs 1939 SC 11; Sharp v Thomson 1995 SC 455 per Lord President Hope at 
475. Wilson & Duncan, Trusts (n 3) paras 1-43f, cite other sources supporting this view. 
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while the beneficiary has equitable ownership.21 As property must be transferred into trust to become 
trust property, it is impossible for the truster to own such property in Scots law, unless they are also a 
trustee. The beneficiary, meanwhile, has personal rights exercisable against the trustee.22 It is clear that 
if a beneficiary creates a floating charge, its personal rights are part of its property which may be covered 
and attached by the floating charge.23 However, for the purposes of this article, trust property is the 
property owned (or held) in trust by a trustee. 
The established position in Scots law, that a trustee owns the trust property, has been expanded 
upon in recent times, especially by Professors Gretton and Reid, to explain some of the characteristics 
of the trust, not least that trust property is protected from the personal creditors of the trustee.24 This 
increasingly accepted view25 provides that although a trustee owns trust property it does so in a special 
trust patrimony, and the beneficiary has personal rights against the trustee in relation to that patrimony. 
As Carey Miller contends, this special patrimony analysis is used “to preserve the unititular dogma of 
Scots property law”.26 It also moves the legal doctrine beyond a simple sui generis description of the 
rights of parties in a trust.27 Identifying a separate patrimony of trust assets and liabilities in addition to 
a trustee’s general (private) patrimony (i.e. the dual patrimony approach) can be helpfully applied when 
analysing the floating charge’s relationship with trust property. And, in terms of integrating the floating 
charge into wider Scots law, there is, of course, considerable merit in the charge’s interaction with trusts 
aligning with trusts law generally. 
As this article progresses, it is useful to have in mind two particular scenarios regarding floating 
charges and trust property: 
 
Scenario 1: X Ltd grants a floating charge over its property and undertaking to B Bank, to secure a loan. 
X Ltd then creates a trust, appointing Y Ltd as trustee and designating Z Ltd as beneficiary. X Ltd 
                                                          
21 For an explanation of legal and equitable ownership in English trusts law, see S Worthington, Equity, 2nd edn 
(2006) 63ff. 
22 See n 18 and n 20. 
23 Unlike for trustees (see below), there is no separate trust patrimony for the beneficiary’s rights in a trust. 
24 See e.g. G L Gretton, “Trust and patrimony” in Scots Law into the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of WA 
Wilson (ed H L MacQueen), (1996) 182; G L Gretton, “Trusts without equity” (2000) 49 ICLQ 599; K G C 
Reid, “Patrimony not equity: the trust in Scotland (2000) 8 ERPL 427 updated and republished in R Valsan (ed), 
Trusts and Patrimonies (2015) 110. For some criticism of the patrimonial approach, see P Matthews, “Square 
peg, round hole? Patrimony and the Common Law trust” in R Valsan (ed), Trusts and Patrimonies (2015) 62, 
especially 78ff.  
25 As Reid (n 24) 123f notes, in Scotland “the central role of patrimony has been accepted by legal scholars, by 
the Scottish Law Commission, and, increasingly, by the courts, and can now be regarded as ‘clearly 
established’.” As well as the cases cited by Reid (123 at n 55), see Advocate General v Murray Group [2015] 
CSIH 77; 2016 SC 201 at para 50; and Shenken v Phoenix Life [2015] CSOH 96 at paras 19f. See also the 
Discussion Paper on The Nature and the Constitution of Trusts (Scot Law Com DP No 133, 2006) paras 2.16-
2.28 and Report on Trust Law (n 3) para 3.4.  
26 D Carey Miller with D Irvine, Corporeal Moveables in Scots Law, 2nd edn (2005) para 12.10 n 91. 
27 E.g. in terms of explaining why a beneficiary’s personal right has priority over the trustee’s personal creditors. 
For a recent example of the beneficiary’s right being considered a right between a personal and a real right, see 
Joint Administrators of Rangers Football Club plc, Noters [2012] CSOH 55, 2012 SLT 599 per Lord Hodge at 
para 31. For discussion, see Reid (n 24) at 114f. 
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Scenario 2: X Ltd creates a trust, appointing Y Ltd as trustee, and designating Z Ltd as beneficiary. X 
Ltd transfers property into the trust. Subsequently, Y Ltd grants a floating charge over its property and 
undertaking to B Bank, to secure a loan.28 This floating charge later attaches. 
 
 
C. THE CHARGING OF TRUST PROPERTY 
 
(1) The law of trusts 
 
Trustees in Scots law can generally grant security rights over trust property where the corresponding 
borrowing is for the purposes of the trust. This can be specified as a power in the trust deed but is also 
                                                          
28 This borrowing could be for Y Ltd’s private purposes, with the corresponding floating charge being created 
without reference to trust property. Alternatively, the borrowing could be for the trust and an attempt might be 




a statutory default power.29 There is, therefore, no general rule in the law of trusts which prohibits 
security rights, including floating charges, from being granted. Indeed, the statutory power refers to the 
ability to use the “trust estate or any part thereof, heritable as well as moveable” as security. The fact 
that the whole estate or parts of it can be utilised in this way, rather than only particular items of 
property, also supports the view that trust law does not preclude the creation of a floating charge over 
trust property. The wide default powers to borrow and grant security mean that creating security rights 
is considered a tool to help the trustees fulfil the trust purposes. It would, of course, be possible for a 
trust deed to exclude the power to create a floating charge. However, a floating charge purportedly 
created by a trustee, such as in Scenario 2, would be protected from challengers contending that the 
creation was “at variance with the terms or purposes of the trust”.30 But neither this nor the express trust 
purposes are relevant where a charge is created over property by a non-trustee company before that 
property is transferred into a trust, i.e. a Scenario 1 case.31 That is true even if the chargor itself becomes 
a trustee after the charge’s creation. 
 
(2) The law of floating charges 
 
There is no common law power that enables legal or natural persons to create floating charges in Scots 
law. It is only due to statutory provision that they can be created by companies and certain other entities. 
Therefore, only such entities acting as trustees could have the power to grant floating charges over trust 
property. The Companies Act 1985, s 462(1), provides that a company may create a floating charge 
“over all or any part of the property… which may from time to time be comprised in its property and 
undertaking”. Consequently, in determining if trust property is chargeable, the fundamental question is 
whether trust property is “property… in [the company’s] property and undertaking”. Trust property 
certainly falls within the first usage of “property” in s 462(1); the things (or rights) which can be held 
in trust are the same things (or rights) which can be property outside the trusts context. The difficulty 
with s 462(1) is whether trust property falls within the second part of the quoted term.32 On this point, 
                                                          
29 Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921 s 4(1)(d), gives a general power to trustees “To borrow money on the security of 
the trust estate or any part thereof, heritable as well as moveable.” See also Gordon v Campbell (1842) 1 Bell’s 
App 428 for a case involving security granted by trustees over property in the trust estate.  
30 Trusts (Scotland) Act 1961 s 2(1). There would, however, be an ultra vires breach of trust. 
31 W A Wilson, The Scottish Law of Debt, 2nd edn (1991) para 9.18, writes that s 2 of the 1961 Act can only 
apply where the trust existed when the floating charge was granted. Cf K G C Reid, “Trusts and floating 
charges” 1987 SLT (News) 113 at 115. See also K G C Reid, The Law of Property in Scotland (1996) para 691. 
32 I.e. whether it is in the company’s property and undertaking. In a different context (the registration of 
charges), the Companies Act 2006 s 859J(1), by referring to a company acting as trustee of “property” or 
“undertaking”, suggests that these terms can include trust property; however, the property or undertaking are 
crucially not referred to as the company’s. 
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Professor Wilson suggests that although trust assets are, in one respect, the company’s property, they 
may not be “comprised in its property and undertaking”.33  
The instrument creating a floating charge specifies the property over which the floating charge 
is created, up to a maximum of all property in the company’s property and undertaking. With respect 
to trust property, there are three possibilities. Firstly, the instrument can expressly exclude trust 
property, in which case the floating charge undoubtedly does not cover such property. Secondly, the 
instrument can omit mention of trust property. If so, it also seems that property held in trust is not 
charged. In Tay Valley Joinery Ltd v CF Financial Services Ltd34 a floating charge was granted over 
the whole property of Tay Valley Joinery Ltd (TVJL).35 A few days later, TVJL entered into an invoice 
discounting agreement for present and future book debts, in the form of a contract of sale, but without 
formal assignation. The Second Division decided that the agreement was a valid declaration of trust 
under Scots law and had been intimated to the beneficiary (the defender).36 In addition, TVJL intimated 
details of the book debts to the beneficiary on an ongoing basis, which was sufficient to transfer newly 
arising debts into the trust.37 As TVJL held the book debts in trust, the court determined that they were 
not attached by a pre-existing floating charge, when joint receivers were appointed to TVJL’s whole 
property and undertaking. Given that the maximum extent of a charge is the same as regards its creation 
and attachment (the company’s property and undertaking),38 the case indicates that a party granting a 
floating charge over all the property in its property and undertaking, without express mention of trust 
property, is doing so for non-trust property only.39  
The third possibility is that the floating charge instrument expressly includes trust property. The 
consequences of this were not considered in Tay Valley. Commentators have, however, interpreted the 
case widely, and there appears to be a general view that trust property cannot be the subject of a floating 
charge in any circumstances.40 But this is often asserted without explanation and without consideration 
of what the outcome would be if an attempt were made to expressly charge trust property. Let us imagine 
a Scenario 2 case in which property has been transferred to a professional trustee company, Y Ltd, 
acting solely as a trustee.41 The company wishes to raise finance to help fulfil the trust purposes and it 
                                                          
33 Wilson, Debt (n 31) para 9.18. He adds that it is “of course always possible to deal with the matter expressly 
in the instrument of the charge”. What he means here is unclear, especially if trust property is expressly included 
in the instrument. 
34 1987 SLT 207. 
35 The case involved the Companies (Floating Charges and Receivers) (Scotland) Act 1972 (ss 11 and 13(7)) but 
the relevant provisions were substantially the same as the current provisions. 
36 Although the invoice discounting agreement in Tay Valley was expressly to be governed by English law, the 
question of which Scottish assets were attached was to be determined by Scots law: see e.g. per Lord Robertson 
at 211. 
37 Tay Valley per Lord Dunpark at 216 and per Lord Robertson at 213. 
38 For attachment, see Companies Act 1985 s 463(1); Insolvency Act 1986, ss 53(7), 54(6) and Sch B1, para 
115(1B) and (3). 
39 The case is discussed further below in relation to attachment and truster-as-trustee trusts. 
40 See e.g. n 7 above. Cf Reid (n 31), who disagrees with the decision in Tay Valley. Reid’s view is discussed 
further below in the context of truster-as-trustee trusts. 
41 Companies are frequently established solely for the purpose of acting as a trustee. 
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seeks to create a floating charge in favour of a lender. Y Ltd could state in the charge instrument that it 
is acting as trustee of a specific existing trust and that only property it owns as trustee is charged. 
Furthermore, the limitation of the intended charge to trust property would be identifiable to third parties 
from the copy of the instrument accessible from the charges register.42 This situation differs from the 
one in Tay Valley in various respects and it is not inconceivable that a court could accept the validity of 
a floating charge over trust property in such circumstances. Yet it would be a mistake for it to do so. 
It is true that, in general terms, a trustee may contract with a creditor to the effect that trust 
assets, rather than personal assets, are to be used to satisfy the claim of the creditor.43 And it might be 
argued that such freedom should also apply to the company when it charges its property. But if the 
whole property and undertaking of the company represents the statutory maximum of a floating charge’s 
extent, and this does not include trust property (as in Tay Valley), then how can expressly including 
trust property expand the floating charge’s ambit? There is no obvious satisfactory answer to this.  
The application of the dual patrimony approach to the interpretation of “[the company’s] 
property and undertaking” justifies the outcome in Tay Valley, as regards the property escaping the 
charge’s ambit following its transfer into the trust,44 and suggests that it is never possible for a floating 
charge to encompass trust property. If a charge granted over all of the property and undertaking does 
not cover property in a trust patrimony then only property in the company’s general patrimony can ever 
be charged. And whenever the chargor transfers property out of its general patrimony, the charge ceases 
to affect that property. The Companies Act 1985, s 462(1), seems to presuppose that a company only 
has one property and undertaking for floating charge creation purposes. Consequently, there is no scope 
to argue that a company, in its capacity as a trustee, has a separate property and undertaking for trust 
property. However, one might contend that if a company is established solely for the purpose of being 
a trustee and only engages in business for the trust, then the company’s only property and undertaking 
corresponds to property in its trust patrimony. But this would be incorrect, as the company’s general 
patrimony still exists; it is the default patrimony and the company has the capacity to hold property in 
it, even if it is inactive.  
Consistency of interpretation with related legislative terms, discussed at section D below as 
regards attachment and enforcement, also supports the view that a company’s property and undertaking 
is limited to its general patrimony. Nevertheless, identifying the potential for a separate property and 
undertaking suggests a possible route for reforming the law to accommodate floating charges over trust 
property. Given the distinction between general and trust patrimonies in wider law, it would be sensible 
                                                          
42 The company could even provide a statement to the registrar specifying that it is a trustee: Companies Act 
2006 s 859J(1). 
43 See Gordon v Campbell (1840) 2 D 639, affd (1842) 1 Bell’s App 428; Cullen v Baillie (1846) 8 D 511; 
Lumsden v Buchanan (1865) 3 M (HL) 89 per Lord Cranworth at 95. Also see Cunningham v Montgomerie 
(1879) 6 R 1333; J St Clair and J Drummond Young, The Law of Corporate Insolvency in Scotland, 4th edn 
(2011) para 12.33; R G Anderson, “Introduction to Juristic Persons”, in I G MacNeil (ed), Scots Commercial 
Law (2014) paras 1.12 and 1.15. 
44 No view is expressed here regarding the validity of the trust itself in Tay Valley. 
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for reform in this area to adhere to such separation. To enable a floating charge to extend from one 
patrimony into another would be complicated in various respects, including in relation to the allocation 
of loans (secured by the charge) to the different patrimonies, ranking against competing rights, issues 
of enforcement and, potentially, publicity to third parties. Another reason why the decision in Tay Valley 
was justified was because it avoided these very issues. 
The most appropriate approach for reform would be to allow for the charging of trust property 
only where the charge is created expressly over property held in a specified trust that already exists (e.g. 
a charge created by Y Ltd in the version of Scenario 2 outlined above). Using a patrimonial analysis, 
combined with a distinction between a general property and undertaking and a trust one, to underpin 
any reform in the law would make it simple to determine when property leaves the ambit of a charge 
over trust property: any transfer out of the trust patrimony would mean the property was no longer 
covered by the charge. This would also apply even if the property was sold and transferred into the 
trustee’s general patrimony.45 The charge would, however, encompass money or other property 
received in payment for that transferred property.  
 
(3) Trustee and registration problems 
 
The Scottish Law Commission has noted that attempting to facilitate floating charges over trust property 
also raises questions as to whether and how a plurality of trustees (including non-corporate trustees) 
could grant a charge and how the replacement of the chargor as a trustee could and should be dealt 
with.46 This section gives further consideration to these matters.  
A floating charge is a security interest granted by one company over its own property. However, 
for a trust there can be multiple trustees. So, if a floating charge could be created in Scenario 2 by Y 
Ltd over its trust property, how would this work where it was one of a number of trustees (e.g. alongside 
Y2 and Y3)? Trustees have joint ownership of trust property, so each trustee has a shared title to the 
whole of each item of property.47 However, in contrast to where a party owns property in common, Y 
Ltd does not have a severable ownership right in the property that it owns jointly. This means that Y 
Ltd could not unilaterally create a floating charge over trust property, if there were additional trustees. 
                                                          
45 Or presumably into another one of its trust patrimonies, if it was trustee for multiple trusts. A transfer into a 
trustee’s general patrimony would be a breach of fiduciary duty. However, such a transaction could be 
authorised by the trust deed or the beneficiaries (for discussion and sources, see Discussion Paper on Breach of 
Trust (Scot Law Com DP No 123, 2003), paras 4.2-4.6). 
46 Report on Registration (n 8) para 2.32. Cf Law Reform Committee, Twenty-Third Report: The Powers and 
Duties of Trustees (Cmnd 8733) (1982) para 2.20, regarding English law. 
47 See e.g. Gordon’s Trustees v Eglinton (1851) 13 D 1381 per Lord Justice-Clerk Hope at 1385; and the 
discussion and authorities cited at Reid, Property (n 31) paras 34ff. See also D Kleyn and S Wortley, “Co-
ownership” in R Zimmermann, D Visser and K Reid, (eds) Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: 
Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004) 704ff. 
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Even with the agreement and execution of a majority, or all, of the trustees there would be problems.48 
Any person, whether natural or juristic, may have the power to grant fixed securities but floating charges 
can only be created by certain corporate entities. Thus, if Y2 and Y3 are natural persons, they would 
have no power to create a floating charge, and so a charge could not be created collectively by the 
trustees. In fact, it is not even possible under the current law to create a combined floating charge where 
Y Ltd, Y2 and Y3 are all companies (and it is unclear, in any event, when this would be of any value 
outside the context of trusts). For joint property, such as trust property, there is merely a single title, and 
the grant of a valid subordinate right in the property probably requires all owners to participate in the 
grant.49 Consequently, reform would be required to enable multiple companies to jointly grant the same 
floating charge. The registration of charges regime, which involves registration against a particular 
company, would also need to be amended to accommodate the registration of such a charge. 
There has been doubt as to whether the registration of charges requirements in the Companies 
Acts even apply to “charges” (of any kind) granted by a company in its capacity as a trustee.50 The non-
application of registration provisions would be especially problematic with a floating charge, as the 
only publicity regarding its creation is provided by its registration in the charges register. Nevertheless, 
securities granted by trustee companies have often been registered as a precaution. And under the 
current regime,51 it is possible (but not obligatory) for a statement to be delivered to the registrar 
specifying that the grantor company is acting as a trustee.52 This shows that security granted over a 
company’s trust property is capable of being registered. Furthermore, Professor Gullifer has rightly 
suggested that requiring registration of such “charges” (for them to be effective) is “the better view” in 
practical and policy terms.53 This should be considered to represent the current law. 
Even if a floating charge could be validly created over trust property, there might be other 
inherent risks to a creditor if they chose to accept such a charge. If there was only one chargor, such as 
Y Ltd, and it resigned or lost its position as trustee, the floating charge would no longer cover the trust 
property. This would be true whether Y Ltd had been a joint trustee or a sole trustee. The result would 
be appropriate given that the charge would be registered against Y Ltd, and so would no longer be 
identifiable by third parties dealing with the trust and its trustee(s).54 It demonstrates the important point 
                                                          
48 The default rule is that a decision is made by a quorum, which is a majority of trustees: Trusts (Scotland) Act 
1921 s 3(c). It is unclear whether execution by a majority or all trustees is required for a conveyance: see 
Harland Engineering Company v Stark’s Trustees 1914 2 SLT 292. This is also the case for the granting of a 
security. 
49 See e.g. Reid, Property (n 31) para 36 and n 48. 
50 L Gullifer (ed), Goode on Legal Problems of Credit and Security, 5th edn (2013) para 2.22. 
51 Companies Act 2006 ss 859A-859Q. 
52 Companies Act 2006 s 859J(1). 
53 Gullifer, Legal Problems (n 50) para 2.22. Companies Act 2006 s 859A(1) refers to a company creating a 
charge, with no distinction as to whether or not it holds the charged property in trust. Thus, various securities 
created by Scottish companies acting as trustees must also be registered to make them effective. 
54 The Companies Act 2006 s 859C could, however, allow for registration of the charge against a replacement 
corporate trustee, but it is unclear how this provision applies to floating charges. 
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that a floating charge would not be a security over the trust or the trust property itself, but a security 
over the property which the chargor holds in trust when attachment occurs.  
Interestingly, the wording of the Trusts (Scotland) Act 1921, s 20, regarding the effect of the 
resignation of a trustee, bears some comparison to the references to “property and undertaking” in the 
floating charges legislation: “… such trustee shall be thereby divested of the whole property and estate 
of the trust, which shall accrue to or devolve upon the continuing trustees or trustee…”. The express 
inclusion of property and estate “of the trust” contrasts with the absence of a trust reference in the 
floating charges legislation, which again indicates that the company’s property and undertaking only 
relates to its general patrimony. 
Bearing in mind the potential hazards if a trustee chargor leaves its position as trustee, an 
intending chargeholder could require agreement from the chargor (and other trustees) that its permission 
would be sought, or it would at least be informed, if the chargor wished to resign or was to be removed.55 
This would, however, only be contractual and, unlike the position in England, automatic crystallisation 
clauses are ineffective:56 the only attachment events in Scotland are the ones specified in the 
legislation.57 One solution would be to legislate to give effect to automatic attachment clauses, while 
another would be to create a further attachment event, which would take place the moment before a 
chargor ceases to be a trustee.58 However, these forms of attachment could inhibit the successful 
operation of the trust and there might be related enforcement and publicity issues. If, instead, 
chargeholders were just expected to accept the risk that if the chargor lost its status as a trustee, then 
the charge would no longer cover the property, this might undermine the appeal of taking a floating 
charge over trust property.  
The most effective system would allow a creditor to obtain a floating charge over all or any of 
the property in the trust from time to time, rather than the trust property of a particular trustee. If a trust 
had separate legal personality and could create a floating charge (and this could be registered against 
the trust), it would enable multiple trustees, including non-corporate trustees, to create the charge and 
would mean that the charge would continue to affect trust property even if the original chargor was 
replaced as a trustee. However, trusts in Scotland are not legal persons, within the registration of charges 
regime or elsewhere. Importantly, there is a contrast between the nature of the trust patrimony and our 
current conception of a floating charge, as a security connected to the patrimony of a single non-
replaceable chargor, including as regards registration. Without the possibility of a floating charge being 
                                                          
55 For details regarding the resignation and removal of trustees, see Report on Trust Law (n 3) paras 4.10ff. 
56 There are difficulties regarding floating charges over trust property in English law, including in relation to the 
replacement of the chargor as trustee; however, it seems that it may be possible to circumvent these issues: D 
Hayton (general ed) with P Matthews and C Mitchell, Underhill and Hayton, Law Relating to Trusts and 
Trustees, 19th edn (2016) paras 81.54ff. 
57 For English law, see e.g. Gullifer, Legal Problems (n 50) paras 4-53ff; W J Gough, Company Charges, 2nd 
edn (1996) 137 and ch 11. 
58 The attachment would also need to be connected to a particular enforcement process. 
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created and registered in relation to the trust patrimony (irrespective of the identity of trustees at a given 
time), the value of enabling the charging of trust property would seem to be diminished. 
 
D. ATTACHMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF FLOATING CHARGES 
 
The attachment of a floating charge is tied to the property the chargor owns when attachment occurs (as 
limited by the property charged by the relevant instrument). This explains why a floating charge created 
by X Ltd in Scenario 1 does not attach to property it has already transferred into trust. For Scenario 2 
cases, more detailed consideration is required as to whether trust property is property in Y Ltd’s 
“property and undertaking”. As mentioned above, there is consistency in language between the 
provisions for the creation and attachment of a floating charge.59 Clearly then, if a charge cannot be 
created over trust property, attachment to such property is also not possible. Yet the specific analysis of 
attachment is also worthwhile as, conversely, it gives us further evidence as to whether or not trust 
property can be successfully charged in Scots law. 
The present section demonstrates that the use of the dual patrimony thesis and previous 
authority regarding trust property in insolvency supports the view that such property cannot be attached 
by a floating charge. And, as will be discussed, this extends to truster-as-trustee trusts. The section also 
considers whether the concept of beneficial interest could hinder the attachment of trust property and 
other more hypothetical issues, such as how a floating charge over trust property could be enforced, and 
how an attached charge might rank against competing rights. 
 
(1) Consistency with insolvency law regarding trust property 
 
A floating charge attaches to property in the context of the insolvency-related processes of liquidation, 
receivership and administration. As already noted, it was held in Tay Valley60 that a floating charge over 
the whole of a company’s property did not include property subsequently transferred into a trust, of 
which the company was sole trustee. Consequently, the trust property was not attached by the charge 
upon the chargor entering receivership. The position is consistent with case law involving trusts within 
an insolvency context. In Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Millar61 the House of Lords decided that the 
term “whole property of the debtor” (and related wording) in bankruptcy legislation did not include 
property held by the debtor in trust (including a latent trust), and such property was therefore protected 
                                                          
59 As regards liquidation, the Companies Act 1985 s 463(1), provides that a floating charge granted by a 
company entering that process attaches to “the property then comprised in the company’s property and 
undertaking” or part thereof. For attachment in receivership, see Insolvency Act 1986 s 53(7) and s 54(6); and 
for attachment in administration, see Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 115(1A)-(1B) in combination with para 
65(3)(b); and Sch B1, para 115(2) and (3). See also the text corresponding to n 111 below. 
60 1987 SLT 207. 
61 Heritable Reversionary Co Ltd v Millar (1892) 19 R (HL) 43. 
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from that party’s personal creditors.62 If “[the company’s] property and undertaking” has an equivalent 
meaning, then trust property is not attachable by a floating charge.  
In contrast to the position for sequestration in the current bankruptcy legislation,63 trust property 
is not expressly excluded from the property included within a liquidation. It is, however, generally 
accepted that trust property does not fall within the meaning of the company’s “property” available to 
a liquidator.64 Indeed, it is difficult to understand how certain liquidation provisions would operate if 
trust property was included.65 Very similar statutory language is used for the related processes of 
receivership and administration, which indicates that there is consistency in meaning across the different 
processes.66 
Before Tay Valley, Halliday suggested that the express creation of a trust to enable a purchaser 
to hold goods for a seller until payment67 “would be valid in a question” between the seller (as 
beneficiary) and inter alia a liquidator or receiver of the purchaser.68 Tay Valley affirms the correctness 
of the view that a floating charge attaching in receivership will not affect trust property. Related to this, 
St Clair and Lord Drummond Young also consider that “property” subject to the floating charge (in the 
Companies Act 1985 and the Insolvency Act 1986) excludes trust property, as it has the same meaning 
outlined by Lord Watson in Heritable Reversionary,69 which they deem to have wide-ranging 
applicability to insolvency regimes.70 In addition, they state that a floating charge’s nature means its 
holder expects property to be alienated and a trust is a mechanism for doing so. In their view, the trust 
should still have priority where it is latent and was created before a floating charge; the floating charge 
does not create real rights in particular items of property and there is an assumption that property may 
be alienated by the company.71 However, an existent latent trust is not akin to a future alienation but, 
                                                          
62 The term was used in the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1856 s 102, in the context of property vesting in the 
trustee in sequestration. For the corresponding terms in earlier legislation, see Heritable Reversionary per Lord 
Herschell at 45 and per Lord Watson at 50. For the legal position before Heritable Reversionary, see e.g. H 
Goudy, A Treatise on the Law of Bankruptcy (1886) at 252 and 285f and his case note at (1891) Jur Rev 365 
critiquing the First Division’s decision in Heritable Reversionary. (Goudy later acted for the successful 
appellants in the House of Lords). The current equivalent legislative term is “whole estate of the debtor”: 
Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 s 78(1). 
63 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 s 88(1)(c). 
64 See Turnbull v Liquidator of Scottish County Investment Co 1939 SC 5; Smith v Liquidator of James Birrell 
Ltd (No 2) 1968 SLT 174; and Gibson v Hunter Home Designs Limited 1976 SC 23. See also Bank of Scotland v 
Liquidators of Hutchison, Main, & Co Ltd 1914 SC (HL) 1. For current legislative provisions referring to the 
company’s “property”, see e.g. Insolvency Act 1986 ss 107, 144, 145 and Sch 4, para 6. 
65 E.g. Insolvency Act 1986 ss 107 and 127; and see St Clair & Drummond Young, Corporate Insolvency (n 43) 
para 12-01, n 4. 
66 See the section on enforcement mechanisms below. 
67 There seems no good reason to distinguish here between this type of trust and the type in Tay Valley. 
68 J H Halliday, Conveyancing Law and Practice, vol 1, (1985) 296. See also the discussion of Halliday’s 
position at Wilson & Duncan, Trusts (n 3) paras 4-16f. 
69 At 49f. 
70 St Clair & Drummond Young, Corporate Insolvency (n 43) para 12-03. 
71 Ibid. The authors (at para 12-03, n 26) compare the position for floating charges with Lord Watson’s views in 
Heritable Reversionary at 47, where he states that “Personal creditors of the trustee who neither stipulate for nor 
obtain any conveyance to [the trust estate] do not, in the sense of law, transact on the faith of its being the 
property of the trustee.” 
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rather, an earlier alienation. If the question of whether a floating charge can attach to property is 
dependent upon the holder’s expectations of future dealings by the debtor, the pre-existence of a latent 
trust seems to be of little relevance. A patrimonial explanation seems more appropriate; the floating 
charge is only created over property in the general patrimony (from time to time), it does not create real 
rights in property before attachment and cannot attach to property outside the general patrimony. This 
serves to align the floating charge with the patrimonial distinction that exists in insolvency law:72 the 
context in which the charge attaches.  
 
(2) Beneficial interest 
 
A related issue is the role that beneficial interest plays in preventing a charge from attaching to trust 
property. In Sharp v Thomson73 Lords Clyde and Jauncey used Heritable Reversionary to help interpret 
the meaning of the company’s “property” (and undertaking) in the floating charges legislation and 
thereby identified the chargor’s holding of beneficial interest as a condition for attachment.74 Similarly, 
in Tay Valley, the transfer of beneficial interest (“beneficial ownership”) was considered to prevent the 
attachment of a floating charge.75 The meaning of “beneficial interest” as regards floating charges is 
nebulous. However, the term is clearer in trusts law: it corresponds to the beneficiary’s interest in the 
trust. When Sharp was decided this was more likely to be considered a sui generis personal right.76 
Now, the dual patrimony approach characterises the beneficial interest as a personal right relating to the 
trustee in its trust patrimony.77 In any event, and as noted by Wortley, requiring a chargor to have 
beneficial interest for a charge to attach means a trust beneficiary will always defeat a chargeholder 
under the current law, as only the beneficiary will have beneficial interest.78 The beneficiary does not 
succeed by virtue of ranking. Rather, the floating charge does not attach to the property at all, and 
therefore the chargeholder has no right in the property.79  
This raises the further question of whether beneficial interest would present an obstacle to a 
reformed law that sought to give a trustee company the power to create a floating charge expressly over 
                                                          
72 See the section on enforcement mechanisms below (D(5)) for more details. 
73 1997 SC (HL) 66. 
74 Sharp did not, however, involve the creation of a trust: per Lord Clyde at 85. 
75 Tay Valley per Lord Robertson at 210f, per Lord Dunpark at 214 and per Lord McDonald at 219. 
76 See e.g. Smith, Short Commentary (n 18) at 570ff; Reid, Property, para 10. This could also have been 
described (per Tony Honoré) as a “protected” personal right: see Reid (n 24) at 115. 
77 Albeit that its ranking seems to be postponed (see below). 
78 Assuming the trust was created before the charge’s attachment. S Wortley, “Squaring the circle: revisiting the 
receiver and ‘effectually executed diligence’” (2000) Jur Rev 325 at 332f. However, it would be possible for a 
charge to attach to the “beneficial interest” if the chargor was, instead, a beneficiary. 
79 Analysing the matter in this way also avoids the possibility of the circle of priority, outlined by Wortley (n 78) 
at 329ff, involving arrestment, a floating charge, and a trust. This is because the charge does not attach and so 
the ranking is only between the beneficiary’s right and the arrestment. The “circle” would also now be resolved 
on the basis of ranking alone by MacMillan v T Leith Developments Ltd [2017] CSIH 23; 2017 SLT 415, which 
indicates that a bare arrestment would rank ahead of the floating charge (and the trust beneficiary would also 
prevail against the charge). 
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trust property. After all, a trustee company would never have such interest. Yet, even without a statutory 
provision specifying that beneficial interest would not be a necessary condition in those circumstances, 
it seems unlikely that attachment would be hindered. This is especially true if we consider that beneficial 
interest would probably not have been the determining factor in Heritable Reversionary if the creditors 
were trust creditors and it was the trust estate that was sequestrated.80 Instead, despite the trustee not 
having beneficial interest, it is likely that the creditors would have had valid claims against the trust 
estate.81 This would certainly be the case under the current law as, although trust property is excluded 
from the property that ordinarily vests in a trustee in sequestration,82 a trust estate can be separately 
sequestrated,83 and the trust creditors are ranked in relation to that estate. 
The absence of beneficial interest in the debtor does not therefore exclude trust creditors. The 
actual result of beneficial interest residing in another party is that property is outside the debtor’s general 
patrimony (and associated insolvency processes) and is protected from the debtor’s personal creditors. 
Applied to the floating charge after Sharp, beneficial interest (in the trusts sense) is only an attachment 
condition if the charge has been created over property that is not held in trust. It is true that property 
and undertaking apparently excludes trust property under the current law.84 But if there was a distinct 
trust property and undertaking, corresponding to the company’s trust patrimony, the absence of 
beneficial interest in the trustee company would not preclude a charge’s attachment to such property. 
 
(3) The attachment hypothesis 
 
If a trust property and undertaking did exist, the prevailing interpretation of the attachment “statutory 
hypothesis” (that a floating charge attaches as the relevant form of voluntary fixed security for the 
property in question)85 would generally be unproblematic as trustees (usually) have the power to grant 
fixed securities. Using this hypothesis, it might be thought that, even under the present law, the position 
of the chargeholder would be equivalent to a good faith acquirer of security for value.86 In Tay Valley 
an argument was made, along these lines, to support the chargeholder having priority over the latent 
                                                          
80 One difference between a latent trust, as in Heritable Reversionary, and a non-latent trust is that it is more 
difficult for parties to be trust creditors in relation to the former, as they may not be aware of the latent trust and 
the default patrimony affected by a debt is the general patrimony. 
81 This is an application of the existence of separate trust debts. 
82 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 s 88(1)(c). The same applies in English law: Insolvency Act 1986 s 
283(3)(a). 
83 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 s 6(1)(a) (and see n 116 below). 
84 Following Sharp, the company’s property and undertaking is a narrower concept than all of the property 
within that party’s general patrimony: property can leave the property and undertaking prior to ownership being 
transferred while such property will remain in the general patrimony until the transfer is completed. 
85 See Companies Act 1985 s 463(2); Insolvency Act 1986 ss 53(7) and 54(6); Sch B1, para 115(4); Forth & 
Clyde Construction Co Ltd v Trinity Timber & Plywood Co Ltd 1984 SC 1. 
86 For the implications of being a good faith acquirer for value from a trustee, see St Clair & Drummond Young, 
Corporate Insolvency (n 43) para 12-01. Reid (n 31) at 115 argues that this rule has been replaced for trusts by s 
2 of the 1961 Act, which does not require good faith. 
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trust.87 The court did not, however, decide the point, as the matter had not been raised in the stated case. 
In reality, the issue is irrelevant for determining whether the chargeholder prevails against a beneficiary. 
Logically, the attachment effect can only arise upon attachment taking place and, if that occurs, the 
floating charge, as security in the property, will automatically rank ahead of the beneficiary’s personal 
rights.88 The key point, therefore, is whether trust property is attached and the evidence shows that 
attachment is not possible under the current law. 
 
(4) Truster-as-trustee trust property 
 
Although truster-as-trustee trusts have been impliedly included in the discussion above regarding the 
wider implications of Tay Valley, they also merit special consideration here.89 A competition between 
a floating charge and a truster-as-trustee trust arises where property is charged but is then moved into 
such a trust; the chargor remains owner, but it instead holds the property in its capacity as trustee. The 
principal issue for floating charge purposes is whether this is a sufficient transfer to render the charge 
unattachable to the property.  
Of course, if an attempt to establish a truster-as-trustee trust failed, the floating charge would 
attach to the property, as the latter would continue to belong to the chargor in that party’s general 
capacity. Despite the Second Division’s recognition of the validity of the truster-as-trustee trust in Tay 
Valley, there remains uncertainty as to the circumstances in which this type of trust will be considered 
valid in Scots law within a commercial context.90 In the earlier case of Clark Taylor91 the First Division 
had rejected the argument that a trust had been created, despite acknowledging that commercial truster-
as-trustee trusts could be created in Scots law. Perhaps surprisingly, since Tay Valley there has been 
little case law to further explain the legal position.92 Commercial truster-as-trustee trusts remain 
controversial on policy and doctrinal grounds.93 A registration requirement would alleviate concerns 
                                                          
87 1987 SLT 207 at 219. This was argued using the authority of Redfearn v Somervail (1813) 1 Dow 50, 1 Pat 
App 707 and Burns v Lawrie’s Trs (1840) 2 D 1348. 
88 See the section below on ranking for further details. 
89 The focus is on trusts in which the truster makes itself the sole trustee of the created trust. Allan’s Trs v Inland 
Revenue 1971 SC (HL) 45 definitively established the legitimacy of truster-as-trustee trusts and provided that 
intimation to at least one of the beneficiaries is equivalent to delivery. See also Clark Taylor (n 3) per Lord 
President Emslie at 118; and Tay Valley (n 3) especially per Lord Robertson at 211f. And see K G C Reid, 
“Constitution of trust” 1986 SLT (News) 177 for discussion about the meaning of “delivery”. 
90 Including when they are being used for security purposes. On a related note, the transfer of property into such 
trusts could be a gratuitous alienation in certain circumstances, but it is unclear when precisely that will be the 
case. It is not possible to discuss this further here. 
91 1981 SC 111. 
92 See Report on Trust Law (n 3) para 2.12ff for details of the commercial usage of trusts in recent decades. See 
also D Cabrelli, “Can Scots lawyers trust Don King? Trusts in the commercial context” 2001 6 SLPQ 103. For 
discussion of Tay Valley and earlier cases, see e.g. G L Gretton, “Using trusts as commercial securities” (1988) 
33 JLSS 53; D P Sellar, “Trusts and liquidators – further thoughts” 1988 SLT (News) 194; K G C Reid, “Trusts 
and liquidators – a reply” 1988 SLT (News) 365; and D P Sellar, “Letter to the editor” 1989 SLT (News) 143. 
93 See Clark Taylor per Lord President Emslie at 115f; Wilson & Duncan (n 3) para 4-18; J Macleod, “General 
Principles of Property Law”, in I G MacNeil (general ed), Scots Commercial Law (2014) paras 11.91ff. See also 
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relating to the absence of publicity when property is moved into such a trust but this has been rejected 
by the Scottish Law Commission.94  
As regards registration and publicity, there is a possibility that the creation of a truster-as-trustee 
trust for security purposes, by a company, is a registrable charge under the Companies Act 2006, s 
859A.95 A registration requirement would provide notice of the trust to third parties dealing with the 
company and would mean the register provides a more comprehensive impression of the securities 
created by the company. The viewpoint is supported by the fact that such a trust in English law would 
need to be so registered and the charges regime is now UK-wide.96 In addition, the creation of a trust 
for security purposes is a “right in security” in Scots law in the broad sense of the term, just like 
assignation in security, which is identified in the legislation as a charge but is a transfer of property for 
security purposes rather than a real right in security.97 If a trust created for security purposes is a charge, 
the failure to register it would render it void against any liquidator, administrator or creditor of the 
company,98 and would therefore mean the floating charge could attach to the property. However, 
considering a security trust to be a registrable charge is at odds with existing practice as well as the 
accepted understanding of the law under the previous registration regimes. A decision in line with the 
alternative view would be highly controversial and unpopular in certain quarters and could raise doubts 
about many previous security trust transactions. In statutory interpretation terms, the more conservative 
view could be justified by considering “right in security” in the legislation99 to mean only a real right 
in security (thus excluding trusts), with assignation in security merely being an express exception to 
this. Consequently, each argument has its merits and it is difficult to take a concluded position on the 
issue. 
                                                          
e.g. Gretton (n 92) at 53f who argues for the identification of public policy restrictions on the use of trusts as 
securities. St Clair & Drummond Young, Corporate Insolvency (n 43) paras 12-14ff, suggest that the trust must 
represent “an underlying commercial or economic reality” and is unlikely to do this where the subjects selected 
are of a fluctuating nature, e.g. stock-in-trade. In such cases the trust is likely to amount to an attempt to create a 
floating charge by means other than the Companies Act 1985 s 462.  
94 One of the proposals in the Discussion Paper on the Nature and the Constitution of Trusts (n 25) paras 4-16ff, 
was that truster-as-trustee trusts would only be valid if registered in a public register. However, as noted in the 
subsequent Report on Trust Law (n 3) para 3.11, consultees opposed any change in the law and the Scottish Law 
Commission consequently decided that any change would be “highly undesirable”. 
95 Relevant charge documentation requires to be delivered to the registrar of companies within 21 days from the 
day after the creation date of a charge (s 859A(4)). And see s 859E for the date of creation. For the previous 
regime for Scottish-registered companies, see the (now-repealed) ss 878-892 of the Companies Act 2006.  
96 It is even possible for a trust to be considered a floating charge in English law. For the position in England, 
see E McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law, 5th edn (2016) paras 22.16, 22.24f and 24.30f; Gullifer (ed), 
Legal Problems (n 50) para 1-57. See also e.g. Gray v G-T-P Group Ltd Re F2G Realisations Ltd (In 
Liquidation) [2011] BCC 869.  
97 Companies Act 2006 s 859A(7)(b). For the nature of assignation in security in Scots law, see e.g. Discussion 
Paper on Moveable Transactions (n 14) para 7.6; R G Anderson, Assignation (2008) para 7-36; and G L 
Gretton, “The Concept of Security” in D J Cusine (ed), A Scots Conveyancing Miscellany: Essays in Honour of 
Professor J M Halliday (1987) 130. 
98 Companies Act 2006 s 859H(3). 
99 In the Companies Act 2006, s 859A(7)(b). 
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In any event, if a truster-as-trustee trust is validly created, the consequences of this seem to fit 
with the idea that property is transferred out of the company’s property and undertaking, thereby 
removing the possibility of attachment. In Clark Taylor, Lord President Emslie suggested that the steps 
necessary to establish a truster-as-trustee trust would lead to “irrevocable divestiture of the truster and 
investiture of the trustee in the trust estate”.100 This is consistent with property transferring from a 
party’s general patrimony to its trust patrimony. And in Tay Valley the floating charge was granted over 
property in the chargor’s general patrimony (its property and undertaking) and the moving of property 
into trust was, in patrimonial terms, a transfer like any other. The floating charge could therefore not 
attach. (As a result, it seems appropriate to characterise such a situation as a Scenario 1 case, in which 
the same party takes on the roles of both X Ltd (the truster) and Y Ltd (the trustee).) 
By contrast, Professor Reid, as well as raising powerful policy and doctrinal objections to the 
validity of the trust in Tay Valley, has written that the chargeholder (acting through a receiver) should, 
nevertheless, have prevailed against the beneficiary.101 He argues that a chargeholder is akin to a secured 
creditor upon attachment, and such a creditor has priority over a beneficiary’s rights.102 But, when we 
apply a patrimonial analysis, it appears that floating charges and fixed securities interact with trust 
property differently. For example, A Ltd grants a floating charge to B Bank over its whole property and 
undertaking and then a fixed security over particular property, P, to C Bank. The fixed security gives C 
Bank a real right in P, while B Bank’s floating charge does not. And when the floating charge 
subsequently attaches it does not attach to P, as P is not in A Ltd’s (general) property and undertaking 
when attachment occurs. As for C Bank, the fact that its security confers a real right from its creation 
means that it continues to encumber P when P is “transferred” into A Ltd’s trust patrimony. (If A Ltd 
had granted C Bank’s security over the property when it was already in trust, the property would also 
be encumbered.)103 Using the floating charge’s attachment effect, as if it were a fixed security, to argue 
that it should automatically prevail against a beneficiary’s right is the incorrect approach. As already 
stated, the effect of attachment is only relevant if attachment actually takes place. 
Since he espoused the views noted above, Professor Reid has helped develop the dual patrimony 
theory of trusts in Scots law. An apparent implication of this theory is that property moving from one 
patrimony to another can be considered equivalent to a transfer, as regards the floating charge and the 
chargor’s property and undertaking. If this “pure” form of the dual patrimony approach is not to 
apply,104 explanation is required as to how a floating charge could attach in spite of the property leaving 
the chargor’s general patrimony. It would also need to be considered whether parties such as preferential 
                                                          
100 At 118. 
101 Reid (n 31) at 115; and see Reid, Property, para 691 n 6. 
102 This is correct regarding such security ranking ahead of a beneficiary (see the ranking section below), but 
does not apply here. 
103 Redfearn v Sommervails (1813) 1 Dow 50 is considered the leading case, although it involved an assignation 
in security rather than real security.  
104 Gretton & Steven (n 2) para 23.39, acknowledge that it is debatable whether the transfer from the private 
patrimony to the trust patrimony is a true transfer. 
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creditors should receive special protection, even if the debts due to them arose in relation to the 
chargor’s general patrimony. Yet, rather than formulating piecemeal rules, is it not more appropriate to 
simply establish the circumstances in which a truster-as-trustee trust will be recognised and, where it is 
so recognised, for the general consequences of transferring property into trust to apply? The current 
law, on the basis of Tay Valley, is that if property is transferred into a truster-as-trustee trust it will not 
be attached by a floating charge that was created at an earlier date. The dual patrimony analysis, pushed 
to its logical “pure” conclusion supports this result.  
 
(5) Enforcement mechanisms 
 
The Scottish Law Commission has recognised some of the difficulties regarding the attachment and 
enforcement of floating charges for trust property. In its Report on Registration of Rights in Security by 
Companies, the Commission noted that trust property is not included in a company’s receivership or 
liquidation, relying on Heritable Reversionary, and therefore it could not ascertain how attachment of 
a charge would take place.105 Furthermore, a chargeholder depends upon a liquidator, receiver or 
administrator for the realisation of attached property and distribution of proceeds. A floating charge 
therefore also differs from a fixed security right insofar as the latter can be enforced against particular 
property in trust, and does not require an insolvency-related process.106 A reasonable conclusion, given 
liquidation’s potential role in the enforcement of a floating charge, is that the company’s property and 
undertaking must fall within the confines of the property available to the liquidator. As already noted, 
the exclusion of trust property from the liquidation of a company is not expressly contained in the 
legislation but is accepted and attested to by case law.107 This is also true in English law.108 Indeed, one 
of the fundamental characteristics of a trust, in English law and Scots law,109 is that it ring-fences 
property held in trust from the trustee’s private estate in insolvency.  
The position for receivership and administration is similar. Although in these situations the 
floating charge attaches to property “subject to the charge”,110 this is limited to the property in the 
company’s property and undertaking at the relevant time, due to the content of the creation provision 
in s 462(1) of the Companies Act 1985.111 Therefore, consistency with the position for liquidation 
                                                          
105 Report on Registration (n 8) para 2.31. These issues were not identified in their preceding Discussion Paper 
on Registration of Rights in Security by Companies (Scot Law Com DP No 121, 2002) para 2.42, where the 
charging of trust property and accompanying registration were proposed. 
106 The processes in which a floating charge is enforced do not necessarily depend upon the insolvency of the 
debtor company but “insolvency-related process” is a useful shorthand term to include them all. 
107 See n 64.   
108 See L Tucker et al, Lewin on Trusts, 19th edn (2015) para 22-027, who cite Barclays Bank Ltd v Quistclose 
Investments Ltd [1970] AC 567 and Re Kayford Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 279 as examples. See also Insolvency Law 
and Practice: Report of the Review Committee (“Cork Report”) (Cmnd 8558) (1982) paras 1039ff. 
109 For Scots law see e.g. Wilson & Duncan, Trusts (n 3) paras 1-12ff; Gretton (n 92). For English law, see n 
108, e.g. the Cork Report at para 1045. 
110 Insolvency Act 1986 ss 51(1), 53(7), 54(6) and Sch B1 para 115(1B) and (3). 
111 The same creation provisions apply; no matter which enforcement method is ultimately used. 
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regarding the property attached and available for enforcement can be assumed, and is advisable on the 
grounds of certainty and coherence. There is no apparent reason why the company’s “property” in 
receivership and administration should include trust property when this is not the case for liquidation.112 
Indeed, Tay Valley113 provides that trust property is not subject to a receiver. And there is nothing in 
the insolvency legislation to support the existence of a parallel liquidation, receivership or 
administration of the trust patrimony. 
All of this represents a considerable challenge to the facilitation of floating charges over trust 
property. The Scottish Law Commission suggested that the attachment and enforcement of a floating 
charge over such property would depend upon special provision being made for the winding up of a 
trust.114 Introducing a new trust-specific liquidation process simply to enable the effective charging of 
trust property would be a drastic and complicated step. The same criticisms would apply to any attempt 
to construct a separate administration for the trust patrimony. Allowing a receiver to be appointed over 
trust property would be simpler and more manageable. However, it would be objectionable in policy 
terms (by giving the chargeholder significant power at the expense of other creditors) and would be at 
variance with the general prohibition on the appointment of administrative receivers.115 
Currently, the only insolvency-related process expressly applicable to trust property is 
sequestration, the default insolvency process in Scots law. The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016, s 
6(1)(a), provides that the trust estate “may be sequestrated” (“in respect of debts incurred by it”).116 The 
trust estate (patrimony) is therefore treated separately from a legal person’s general (or private) estate. 
This means that the property a company holds in trust can be sequestrated, even though its general estate 
remains untouched by that sequestration. (In fact, a registered company’s general estate cannot be 
sequestrated.117) At present, sequestration, even of the chargor’s trust property, is not an event or process 
which causes a floating charge to attach and nor does it enable the charge’s enforcement.118 It is true 
that if a purported chargeholder were a trust creditor it would have a claim in a sequestration of the trust 
estate but this would only be a personal unsecured claim for the debt due. The floating charge is a 
                                                          
112 See St Clair & Drummond Young, Corporate Insolvency (n 43) paras 12-02f. 
113 1987 SLT 207. 
114 Report on Registration (n 8) para 2.31. 
115 Insolvency Act 1986 s 72A, as inserted by the Enterprise Act 2002 s 250(1). 
116 In their Report on Bankruptcy and Related Aspects of Insolvency and Liquidation (Scot Law Com No 68, 
1981) para 5.5, the Scottish Law Commission considered that the existing law (Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1913 
s 11, and the earlier cases of J&W Campbell & Co (1899) 6 SLT 406; and Bain, Petr (1901) 9 SLT 14) allowed 
for the sequestration of trust and executor estates. However, they wished to provide a conclusive statement, 
which led to the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 s 6(1)(a) (the predecessor of the same provision in the 2016 
Act). As noted in Macleod (n 93) para 3.42, “the fact that a trust can be sequestrated independently of 
sequestration of any of the trustees also points to the trust being a separate patrimony”. 
117 Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 2016 s 6(2)(a).  
118 It might be problematic if sequestration did cause attachment and enable enforcement, as a trustee in 
sequestration is not one of the parties that a floating charge would be void against if it was not registered in the 
charges register: Companies Act 2006 s 859H(3). 
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statutory creation and without particular legislative provision cannot be recognised as a security to be 
given priority in a sequestration.  
Legislation could, however, provide that the sequestration of a trust estate is an attachment 
event and that a floating charge would be deemed a security in the sequestration. The absence of control 
exercisable by a chargeholder in this context, in comparison to receivership and administration, would 
make this possibility less attractive to lenders, in relative terms. Yet it would minimise changes to the 
existing law of trusts. Additional provisions would, nevertheless, be necessary to give effect to the 
prescribed part for unsecured creditors in relation to the trust estate and to make sure that a chargeholder 
would rank behind preferential trust creditors. Provision could also be made to give a chargeholder a 
special ground on which to have the trust sequestrated, perhaps along the lines of that available for 
liquidation, i.e. where a chargeholder’s security is “in jeopardy”.119 And consideration would need to 
be given to other attachment and ranking issues.120 
Returning to the current law, one final point regarding enforcement is whether liquidators, 
receivers and administrators can manage a trust, despite the trust property being technically excluded 
from the relevant insolvency-related process. If this can be done, could it enable such a party to realise 
property and distribute proceeds to a chargeholder? 
In English law, it is considered possible for a liquidator to administer a trust for an insolvent 
trustee company.121 This applies to administrators too.122 Certain commentators suggest that this is also 
the case in Scots law.123 From a property perspective, the position is dubious if the trust property does 
not fall within the scope of the administration or liquidation.124 However, it might be legally justified 
on the basis that the liquidator has: “Power to do all such other things as may be necessary for winding 
up the company’s affairs and distributing its assets.”125 And there is a similar provision for 
administration.126 By contrast, it has been held in England that an administrative receiver cannot 
administer a trust.127 As regards Scotland, however, St Clair and Lord Drummond Young suggest that 
such a party can do so.128 In the absence of any justificatory statutory power, and with trust property 
                                                          
119 See the Insolvency Act 1986 s 122(2). 
120 See e.g. n 118 and the section on ranking (D(6)) below. 
121 Tucker et al, Lewin on Trusts (n 108) para 22-018, acknowledge that the reasoning may be “questionable, as 
the liquidator’s duty is to get in and distribute the company’s own assets…”, but state that “the convenience of 
the result is obvious”. 
122 Ibid, para 22-020.   
123 See St Clair & Drummond Young, Corporate Insolvency (n 43) para 12-25. 
124 As the liquidator or administrator would have no powers over it. There would also be no benefit to the 
insolvent estate and thus the general body of creditors. 
125 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch 4, para 13. Emphasis added. 
126 Insolvency Act 1986, Sch B1, para 59(1). 
127 Tucker et al, Lewin on Trusts (n 108) para 22-021, state that the receiver cannot act as trustee because the 
trustee’s powers are fiduciary and cannot therefore be the subject of a charge: Re William Makin [1993] BCC 
453; Buckley v Hudson Forge [1999] PensLR 151; Mettoy Pension Trustees [1990] 1 WLR 1587, particularly at 
1616ff.  
128 St Clair & Drummond Young, Corporate Insolvency (n 43) para 12-25. 
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being outside the reach of a receiver, it is hard to see how this can be the case;129 the directors, acting 
on behalf of the company, should still have control of any unattached property, such as property held 
in trust. 
In any event, the management of the trust does not benefit the liquidator, administrator or 
receiver (or the dependent creditors), and they are therefore unlikely to take on such functions.130 If they 
can, and do, administer the trust, the liquidator, administrator or receiver is subject to trustee rights and 
duties.131 This means they must not seek to distribute to a chargeholder without specific authority to do 




There is always a danger of imprecision when discussing the outcome of competitions between floating 
charges and competing rights, such as the rights of trustees or beneficiaries. It is necessary to be clear 
as to whether another right prevails on the basis of non-attachment of the charge or whether it merely 
ranks ahead. Unlike attachment, which is absolute,132 ranking (in its narrow sense) is relative and is 
dependent upon a charge attaching to the property. The ranking of a charge against competing rights 
only becomes relevant when the charge attaches to the property and its holder thereby obtains an 
interest.  
Currently, then, the non-attachment of floating charges to trust property means it is unnecessary 
to consider the rules of ranking and how the rights of a trustee or beneficiary fit with these. If, however, 
the law was to be reformed to enable floating charges over trust property, attention would need to be 
given to how a floating charge would rank against other rights. Although there is much about the current 
ranking provisions for floating charges that could be improved, it would be possible to construct a 
ranking regime that mirrors the present law (e.g. the Companies Act 1985, s 464, and related 
provisions). Such a regime would simply apply to the trust patrimony rather than the company’s general 
patrimony. As regards the trust patrimony, the beneficiary’s right is merely a personal right and would 
not be considered a security (fixed or floating) under the ranking provisions for that patrimony.133 In 
fact, a beneficiary only has the right to trust funds remaining after the payment of all trust debts, even 
unsecured debts.134 
                                                          
129 Unless perhaps this is an express power given in the instrument of charge and is allowable by the terms of the 
trust. 
130 St Clair & Drummond Young, Corporate Insolvency (n 43) para 12-24f. 
131 Ibid. 
132 I.e. property is either attached or it is not. 
133 To meet the definition of “fixed security” in Companies Act 1985 s 486(1), and Insolvency Act 1986 s 70(1), 
something must be “an effective security over… property” in a company’s winding up. 
134 Lamond’s Trustees v Croom (1871) 9 M 662. St Clair & Drummond Young, Corporate Insolvency (n 43) 




St Clair and Lord Drummond Young have contended that a ranking circle of priority would 
emerge if a floating charge attached to trust property.135 They assert that a trust prevails against creditors 
of the trustee company, including preferential creditors and those who have done diligence, but that 
these creditors have priority over a chargeholder, who, in turn, would defeat the trust. (It is presumed 
that their reference to a “trust” is to the right of a beneficiary.) However, under a dual patrimony 
analysis, the parties mentioned could only all rank against each other if the chargeholder and preferential 
creditors or diligence creditors had claims in the trust patrimony. If this were so, then the rights of 
beneficiaries (as postponed creditors) would be defeated by the other parties and the circle would not 
arise. As such, the suggested circularity problem would not afflict a ranking system for trust patrimonies 
that mirrors the current system. 
With respect to the current law of floating charges and trust law, there is one further ranking-
related matter that must be mentioned. A floating charge attaches to property in the chargor’s general 
patrimony, but what happens if a company subsequently seeks to transfer the property into a trust? Is 
the “trust property” subject to the charge, which simply ranks ahead of the beneficiaries’ rights? St Clair 
and Drummond Young suggest that the attached floating charge would prevail over an attempt to create 
a post-attachment trust on the basis of the assignatus utitur jure auctoris principle.136 However, it is 
probably more accurate to state that the charge will have priority because the company’s directors will 
no longer have the power to transfer attached property into a trust; relevant powers will, by that point, 
be held by a liquidator, receiver, or administrator. Therefore, any attempt by the company’s directors 





A floating charge is an ineffective security as regards trust property in Scots law. As this article has 
shown, adopting a patrimonial approach to the interpretation of the floating charge legislative provisions 
appropriately explains why property held by a trustee can never be affected by a floating charge. For 
property to be within a company’s property and undertaking depends upon that property being in the 
company’s general patrimony. And if charged property is moved into a trust patrimony this is treated 
like any other transfer and so renders a floating charge unattachable. This analysis supports the decision 
in Tay Valley and provides desirable unity between the property attached by a floating charge and the 
property that falls within the insolvency-related processes in which the charge attaches and is enforced. 
                                                          
135 St Clair & Drummond Young, Corporate Insolvency (n 43) para 12-03. 
136 Ibid. This Latin maxim is usually used within the context of the assignation of personal rights to mean that all 
defences that a debtor could use against a cedent are also available against an assignee: see e.g. Anderson, 
Assignation (n 97) paras 8-01ff.  
137 If the transfer was valid, it could be voidable as a gratuitous alienation. 
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Using the dual patrimony approach in this context therefore integrates the floating charge with wider 
Scots law. 
As regards potential reform, the charging of trust property no longer seems to be on the Scottish 
Law Commission’s agenda and it is very unlikely that any legislation to reform the law of trusts will 
make such provision. However, if there was demonstrable demand for change from within the 
commercial and corporate sectors then the situation could alter. This article has identified certain ways 
in which the law could be amended to accommodate the charging of trust property. If reform were to 
take place, the charging of property in a company's general patrimony ought to be distinguished from 
the charging of property in the company's trust patrimony.  To do the latter, a trustee company (e.g. in 
a Scenario 2 case) should have to create a floating charge expressly over property in a specified trust 
(of which it is trustee), with public notice being supplied through registration in the charges register. 
Although this article has shown that there are a number of respects in which constructing a suitable 
system would be relatively straightforward, especially if there was to be conformity with the dual 
patrimony analysis and various aspects of the existing law of floating charges, it has also discussed 
some more challenging issues. The charging of trust property would work most effectively if a trust 
itself could create a floating charge, rather than a trustee having to do so (either alone or jointly with 
other trustees). However, conferring something akin to legal personality upon a trust, and concomitant 
registration against the trust itself, would involve a considerable departure from the existing law. A 
further issue would be designing an appropriate attachment event and related enforcement mechanism 
for charges over trust property. It has been suggested that the most sensible option could be to bring 
floating charges within the ambit of sequestration of trusts. But this would still necessitate a certain 
amount of legislative amendment and the absence of control for lenders in sequestration could limit its 
attractiveness.  
To some degree then, creating an effective system for the charging of trust property would be 
onerous and time-consuming. And, as is always the case, the more complex and considerable the 
required changes, the less likely that such changes will be forthcoming, especially in the absence of 
overwhelming demand for reform. For trust property and floating charges, this all means that the 
patrimonial divide separating them is likely to remain an insurmountable obstacle for the foreseeable 
future. 
